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Mary Mifsud’s paper is a cogently argued contribution to Johnstone’s conception of the 
rhetorical wedge as it functions within rhetorical and philosophical argument. Johnstone would 
be justly proud of the critical analysis she provides. As we read her argument, it hinges on 
Johnstone’s conception of ad hominem argument, and more specifically, on his early conceptions 
of inconsistency (Johnstone, 1992/1961) as the principle on which valid attack rests. One 
constant in Johnstone’s long association with rhetoric and argument was his willingness to 
change his mind—otherwise he would not have come to recognize rhetoric’s role in argument 
(both within the public domain and more precisely within the philosophical enterprise). Given 
his later ruminations on the consistency problem, there is a “wedge” that we might create within 
Mifsud’s response to the question “how do we attack the wedge?” Before we come to that point 
in our analysis, our approach will be to take on specific claims advanced, and offer what might 
best be termed “qualifications” to the argument advanced. Our intent is not to reject outright 
specific claims, from an ad rem perspective, but rather to raise questions about the truth value of 
the claim as a factual assertion—on what grounds might it be accepted, and are there conditions 
or limits associated with the claim that should be recognized? 
In beginning, we note that the initial question is raised as a “how” rather than a “why?” 
Raising it in this fashion presumes that one could and should attack as if it were clear why one 
might; Mifsud rightly returns the initial “why?” in noting that if the aim was to keep the 
conversation going, why not advocate the conception rather than seek to attack it? We might also 
note that to attack is to honor the person who formulated the idea: none of us hopes to write in 
obscurity, or to be taken seriously by sycophants only. We learn and grow from being challenged 
by those who, even though they may support the central principles, still see room for 
improvement in the ideas brought forward. Were he present, we believe Johnstone would even 
claim this for his reason—to ask it of one who, as a co-author, was best positioned to know its 
weaknesses and thereby improve on its formulation. A second reason to attack is to claim that 
Johnstone’s claim is simply wrong. However, if one did not support the central principles, there 
is the question of whether or not one could even conceive of the idea’s being wrong, as it would 
not appear to the person as an idea. However it is configured, raising the issue as a “how” rather 
than “why” potentially restricts the realm of responses by focusing attention on what form the 
attack might reasonably take.  
A third reason, and this does presume that one agrees with the central principles, is to claim 
that the idea is unoriginal, that it is not a new conception of how rhetoric functions. As argued 
initially by Johnstone (1990), and more recently by Johnstone and Mifsud (1999), the wedge is 
defined as that space which enables a recipient of a message (an other’s or one’s own) to 
contemplate what it would mean to accept or deny the message. If we assume that rhetoric serves 
to evoke consciousness as the central act of becoming aware of an idea, event, or person not 
previously on one’s radar screen, we might ask if there are parallel ideas that would account for 
the same phenomenon. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) assert that argumentation requires 
the existence of a mind—that to argue is to contact an other’s mind as a condition of existence or 
value. Ehninger (1968) argued that the only standard of validity that had any real meaning was 
the sense of moral obligation a person felt to acquiesce in the face of a stronger argument. 
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McKerrow’s (1990) conception of “pragmatic justification” was likewise based on the 
presumption of one’s free act of determining whether or not an idea of act was worthy of belief 
or action. That one must be conscious to make these determinations—to construe an act as 
argument in Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca’s terms, to decide on acquiescing in Ehninger’s 
formulation, or to decide on the justifiability of an argumentative claim in McKerrow’s sense—is 
a central presupposition not unique to Johnstone’s formulation. That this is the case does not 
seek to destroy Johnstone’s idea by itself. What it does suggest is that to attack from this 
perspective is not an ad rem attack, as it is not advanced from contrary principles. Nor is it a 
strictly ad hominem attack, as it does not seek to draw out an inconsistency. Rather, it seeks a 
third alternative: a measure of an idea’s worth is what it accounts for in practice. To judge the 
various formulations by this criterion is not our aim; our goal is simply to note that alternatives 
exist to the narrow ad rem/ad hominem approaches advanced by Johnstone. Comparing “like” 
formulations for their intrinsic potency becomes a reason to mark those which are more from 
those less useful as accounts of argumentative practice. 
With these initial observations as a frame of reference, we will work through Mifsud’s 
analysis, taking exception to specific comments that are made along the way. Our hope is not to 
offer telling refutations, but rather cautions toward acceptance of claims as advanced. 
Caution 1 
 Mifsud claims that “the very function of rhetoric is to call attention to a situation for which 
objectivity is claimed.” Not in every case would we endorse this claim. Objectivity according to 
whom, on what grounds, with what purpose in mind? The sense of objectivity, and the possibility 
of its being realized, is far more complex than the assertion suggests. It also suggests that there is 
a “truth” that can be known, a singular interpretation of an event that can be discovered and 
agreed on. 
Caution 2 
 To the claim that rhetoric opens the mind to an awareness “of which it has hitherto been 
unconscious” we would offer this qualification: at issue is consciousness at the moment of 
expression. The person may have been conscious of the claim in the past, may have even acted 
on it, but at the moment of expression, given the principle that rhetoric evokes consciousness, 
one should not draw the conclusion that the person was never conscious prior to that moment. 
This is assumed later by Mifsud in noting that “one may for the first time become aware,” 
leaving open the possibility of having already been aware. That rhetoric evokes consciousness, 
as if it were not present already, is questionable: one may be conscious of an idea, but not certain 
of its importance or significance. A rhetor may move one’s conscious awareness toward a 
reassessment of that which one knows. In this instance, the “wedge” is already ever present in 
the mind, but unformed as to direction or purpose. What rhetoric does in this instance is provide 
a reason for changing the value assigned to an already known idea.  
Caution 3 
 That act of creating a wedge does not, in and of itself, create “open-mindedness through the 
coming of contradiction.” There is nothing to prevent a person, once coming into awareness, to 
simply shut down again: the idea is nonsense, the speaker is silly, the request is illegitimate. Any 
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of these responses is equally likely with respect to creation. Of course, Johnstone and Mifsud 
could argue that there is a ‘degeneracy’ component at work here—an absence of bilaterality 
makes for non-genuine argument or rhetoric. Whether degenerate or not, we would claim that 
rhetorical action has taken place: meaning has been assigned and a decision made with respect to 
the request. That open-mindedness has not resulted is not in itself a reason to claim that rhetoric 
has not existed in the transaction. As a corollary, we would note that the entrance of a polemical 
assertion, as a claim on one’s attention, does not result in either revision or abandonment of a 
position. It may also result in a rejection of the polemic statement. Or it may result in a 
disavowal of interest to continue the dialogue, without either revising or abandoning the position; 
one could simply say that it is unimportant—neither critical to rethink, nor necessary to abandon, 
simply not useful to worry over. Thus, while the “mortality of inquiry comes with the stiffening 
of a position” (which implies rejection of the attack), it may also die from lack of interest in 
maintaining the exchange. 
Caution 4 
We accept the notion that “not all rhetoric is wedge-like.” But is partisan rhetoric, which 
presumes conscious agreement exists prior to the act, then not rhetorical? Note that if rhetoric 
can exist in the presence of a pre-existing consciousness, it is not the case that only the creation 
of a wedge constitutes that unconsciousness. And does such rhetoric always preclude the 
conscious deliberation on alternatives? Not if the rhetor begins by attacking the position of an 
opponent by raising that person’s ideas and then arguing against them. The audience, conscious 
of its own position, has to become also conscious of alternatives. Nor is thinking of them 
precluded by the simple act of the rhetor avoiding their mention. When the coach exhorts her 
team to win (when their record is 4-15 and they are playing a 19-0 team), would it be reasonable 
to presume that at least one of the players might consciously think of the alternative—“we might 
lose”?). 
Caution 5 
 If it were the case that rhetoric only wedges, and does not also present a bridge via 
identification, does it follow that the mind “will collapse into schizophrenia?” We think this 
unlikely, at best a worst-case scenario. If consciousness exists as a consequence of having been 
aroused, is further rhetorical expression from the outside necessary to furnish the bridge? The 
idea of “reflexive rhetoric” is the solution proposed (Johnstone and Mifsud, 1999; Mifsud, 1998; 
Mifsud and Johnstone, 2000): the mind attends to itself, providing a bridge across which the 
mind can travel in re-arranging its sundered self. As they observe: “A properly rhetorical 
transaction must both wedge and bridge. What begins as an opening of consciousness must end 
in judgment in order for a rhetorical transaction to reach its telos” (italics in original; p. 77). But 
must judgment be reached, lest schizophrenia take hold? We think not. Judgment may be 
rendered moot by other events at the time of expression. “Asked and answered” may be the sense 
given to an idea—bridged already by the rhetor and endorsed by the recipient—in a sense of 
judgment qualitatively different from that suggested by Johnstone and Mifsud’s analysis. 
Judgment may also be deferred: one waits for additional information, new insights, or simply for 
a time when deliberation might ensue more quietly or efficiently. Suspension of judgment is an 
option that leaves the self intact for the time in between reception and deliberation. 
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Caution 6 
 If we were to assume Johnstone’s (1992/1961, 1978) earlier consistency position, one he 
rightly moves beyond, it could be argued that we could not conceive of the “wedge” were we to 
position ourselves within a different set of philosophical assumptions. As Mifsud argues, 
“opposing positions cannot be pointed out simply to a person because her own position renders 
her incapable of recognizing this opposition as a problem, or possibly even as a phenomenon.” 
To the contrary: That the mind is capable of conceiving and articulating positions completely 
foreign to its own (though one must arguably want to see the world through the ideas of another, 
if only for the purpose of defeating the other), would seem apparent from our ability to 
comprehend the fact that there are different positions. Johnstone could not have arrived at his 
argument without conceiving of its alternatives. His point, however, was that no such valid 
argument, as refutation, could be mounted against any philosophical position from outside that 
position (1978, p. 11), thereby invalidating any ad rem argument. This leads to his inconsistency 
“problem” (Johnstone, 1978, p. 3). Before getting to Mifsud’s final argument on this issue, there 
are two points we would make as a prelude. 
First, though an aside with respect to the general argument, we would be remiss if we did 
not note that the Whately quotation on which Johnstone premises his position derives from the 
Archbishop’s commitment to nominalism (McKerrow, 1988). To the extent that Johnstone 
wishes to claim consistency as a central feature, it would be interesting to explore the nominalist 
foundation that he commits to in citing Whately. 
Second, while we recognize that a recipient of a counter-argument must “see the point of a 
position,” we are not certain why that entails one also seeing the “motivation underlying the 
position” itself. Were we to take a Burkean approach, we could argue that expressing motive is a 
shorthand way of describing the situation or position, but we are not certain that in this is the 
sense of “motivation” that is intended. Is motivation the ground of understanding the point in all 
cases? Without belaboring the matter, we are simply raising the question and seeking elaboration 
of the claim’s warrant.  
The final argument, and Mifsud’s answer to the “how” question, points to the presence of an 
inconsistency in the advocacy of “rhetoric is a wedge” as a position. In doing so, one articulates 
a claim in a unilateral fashion, apart from the context in which it is embedded. To this we 
respond: so? If this is a true inconsistency, it is one that is non-unique, and one that invalidates 
all such advocacy of a singular claim from within a more generalized context; in this instance, to 
claim a distinction stands on its own, independent of its sequential act. The same is true of a 
“bridge” claim: to advocate it alone would constitute the same inconsistency. We could also 
claim, and Mifsud acknowledges this possibility, that the alleged inconsistency is not seen by us 
as an inconsistency. This places us squarely within Johnstone’s “Consistency Problem” (1978, p. 
135). As alluded by Mifsud, Johnstone switched to the claim that what mattered was one’s 
concern for validity,” making validity a “regulative ideal” rather than an “objective property” 
(italics in original, p. 135). Considered in this context, the issue turns on our willingness to worry 
about inconsistency as framed. Again, we might return to the “so what?” question. Are all 
inconsistencies of the same force—do all such claims force either revision or abandonment? If 
rhetoric can admit of degrees, from “mere” to “degenerate” to “full” or “genuine,” why is 
consistency privileged to exist as a uniform force? In the present case, if a consistency issue is 
non-unique, and to enforce it would be to disable all singular advocacy wherein sequential ideas 
are implicated but not addressed, would we wish to claim an impasse? 
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In concluding, we return to Ehninger (1970), this time to the recognition that an argument is 
never finished. It may “end” at some point in agreement, only to be raised again at a later time 
under different circumstances. Mifsud is correct in ending on the same point: expressing an 
inconsistency, if such be the case, simply opens the possibility of awareness and the need for 
defense. Our final caution relevant to this issue: the defense may not, of necessity, be limited to 
either revision or abandonment; it may consider options from total acquiescence to total 
rejection, if not total indifference to the inconsistency as raised. 
Taking a different route, Johnstone (1978) also repudiates the consistency issue by posing a 
conception of the self as capable of holding and resolving contradictory views (p. 137). If we 
move to this view, we drive a new wedge in the analysis as presented: consider ignoring the 
consistency issue as a problematic, and instead concentrate on what rhetoric as consciousness-
evoking is a consciousness of.  The content of what one is made aware of, and its status as 
worthy of assent, is the critical issue with respect to rhetoric’s consequences. It matters little 
whether the idea is consistent or inconsistent if it is unworthy of merit; the evoking of 
consciousness matters, but what matters even more is whether the recipient of a message need 
view the discourse as requiring attendance to one’s own position. 
One Last Note 
While Johnstone was remarkable for the generosity of his spirit and unselfish in his support 
of scholarship, writing this response brought back into clear relief that his argumentative spirit 
was unabashedly forthright—he gave no quarter and expected none in the battle of ideas. We 
hope to have responded in a manner that honors his work. We know that Prof. Misfud will 
continue to do honor to his memory, and we are honored to have played a small role in that 
endeavor. 
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